This paper suggests that the validity of the trade-off (TOT) and pecking-order (POT) theories in explaining financing decisions varies among small, medium and large firms. Using dynamic panel data tests in a sample of 3,439 Spanish firms over the period 1995-2003, results are partially consistent with both explanations but suggest a greater validity of pecking-order predictions for small firms. In small firms, the negative influence of profitability and the positive influence of investment opportunities and of intangible assets on firm debt predicted by the POT are heightened. However, no differences are observed between small and large firms in their speed of adjustment to the target leverage as suggested by the TOT. JEL classification: G32.
Introduction
The finance literature offers two competing but not mutually exclusive models of financing decisions: the trade-off theory (TOT) and the pecking-order theory (POT). The TOT posits that firms maximize their value when the benefits that stem from debt equal the marginal cost of debt.
Additionally, the existence adjustment costs leads to the TOT to suggest a partial adjustment to optimal leverage in each period.
The POT, developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) , focuses on the information asymmetries existing between firm insiders and outsiders. Managers use private information to issue risky securities when they are overpriced. Investors are aware of this asymmetric information problem, and they discount the firm's new and existing risky securities when new issues are announced. Managers anticipate these price discounts, and may forego profitable investments if these must be financed with new risky securities. To avoid this distortion of investments decisions, managers prefer to finance projects with retained earnings, which involve no asymmetric information problem as with risky debt. If there is an inadequate amount of retained earnings, then debt financing will be used. As a result, variation in a firm's leverage is driven not by the trade-off model's costs and benefits of debt, but rather by the firm's net cash flows, and the POT predicts that debt typically grows when investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than retained earnings.
The evidence provided by recent empirical research coincides in underscoring the partial validity of both explanations, but differ when indicating which one is predominant. Whereas Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) , Colombo (2001) , Fama and French (2002) , Tong and Green (2005) , and Yu and Aquino (2009) obtain results that are consistent with the predominance of the POT, Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggest a greater validity of the TOT. However, Frank and Goyal (2003) and Leary and Roberts (2005) obtain evidence that is favourable to both theories without highlighting the predominance of either. This paper extends the above evidence by analyzing whether the validity of both theories is related to firm size in a panel database of Spanish firms over the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] period. The importance of firm size would arise from the greater information asymmetries existing in small firms, which might lead to a greater weight of the pecking order explanations in this type of firm. To analyze how the validity of both theories varies with firm size, we study two aspects: 1) we analyze whether the determinants of firm leverage vary across firm size in a way that is consistent with the predictions of the TOT or the POT, and 2) we analyze whether the prediction of the TOT that firms have a target leverage has a different validity among the three groups of firms (small, medium and large firms). Unlike previous studies, this paper considers not only quoted firms but also non-publicly traded firms, providing evidence about the speed of adjustment to the target leverage of the latter group of firms.
To account for dynamic processes in firm leverage, we use the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel data. GMM models are specifically designed to handle autoregressive properties in firm leverage, potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, and the omission of relevant firm-specific characteristics.
The results of the paper indicate that the TOT and the POT are complimentary/complements in explaining capital structure decisions in Spanish firms. Our results support the hypothesis that the greater information asymmetries in small firms lead to a greater validity of the prediction of the POT in these firms, since the positive influence of investment opportunities and of intangible assets and the negative influence of profitability predicted by the POT are heightened in small firms. The paper shows that small firms have a similar speed of adjustment to the target leverage compared to large firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the influence of firm size in capital structure and the hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the database and the methodology, while Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 presents some conclusions.
Firm size and capital structure theories: Hypotheses
A large number of papers have suggested that firm size is positively related to leverage ratio. The rationale for this belief is the evidence provided by Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) that the relevance of direct bankruptcy costs decreases as firm value increases, suggesting that the impact of these costs on the borrowing decisions of large firms might be negligible. It is also argued that larger firms are more diversified (Titman and Wessels, 1988) , have easier access to the capital markets, and borrow at more favorable interest rates (Ferri and Jones, 1979) . Larger firms with less volatile benefits also have a greater likelihood of being able to fully use tax shields from interest payments, increasing the expected tax benefits of debt (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . For small firms, the conflicts between creditors and shareholders are more severe because the managers of such firms tend to be large shareholders and are better able to switch from one investment project to another (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998) . Informational asymmetries between insiders in a firm and the capital markets are higher for small firms (Harris and Raviv, 1991) . According to these arguments, most empirical studies in fact report a positive sign for the relationship between size and leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Gaud et al., 2005; López-Iturriaga and Rodríguez-Sanz, 2008) .
Although the influence of size on firm debt has been widely analyzed, no study has been carried out to ascertain whether the validity of the TOT and the POT varies with firm size. However, arguments exist that suggest that size is related to the information asymmetry problems that the POT rests on.
Larger firms usually have lower information asymmetries. Larger listed firms are required to submit information to the stock exchange and financial analysts monitor these firms on a regular basis, whereas small non-listed firms are only required to produce a straightforward annual report once a year and are rarely monitored by analysts. Credit rating agencies also monitor the solvency of large firms and reduce information asymmetries between the firm and outside investors. The exposure of large listed firms reduces the information opacity for these firms compared with smaller, non-listed firms. To derive our hypotheses, we assume that with no information asymmetry the POT does not survive and only the TOT applies, whereas the greater the information asymmetry, the greater the validity of the propositions of the POT. This argument leads to our main hypothesis: In order to test this hypothesis, we first analyze how the two theories differ on the determinants of firm leverage, and secondly how both theories differ with respect to the existence of a leverage target in the firm.
Determinants of debt ratio under the TOT and the POT
As potential determinants of firm leverage we consider the same variables as Rajan and Zingales (1995) have shown to influence firm leverage in 7 countries: non-debt tax shield, profitability, growth opportunities, and intangibility of assets.
a) Non-debt tax shields
The TOT predicts that companies have an incentive to take debt because they can benefit from the tax shield due to interest deductibility. However, if firms have non-debt tax shields (NDTS), such as depreciation and investment tax credits, they have a lower incentive to use debt from a tax shield point of view and hence use less debt (Graham, 2000) . Thus, the trade-off explanation predicts a negative coefficient for NDTS in the equation explaining firm leverage. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) , we measure NDTS as the earnings before taxes minus the ratio between the taxes paid and the tax rate.
b) Profitability
In the TOT, a positive relationship between a firm's profitability and debt is expected because taxes, agency costs, and bankruptcy costs push more profitable firms towards higher leverage. More profitable firms should prefer debt to benefit from the tax shield. Moreover, when firms are profitable, all things being equal, they increase their free cash flow and the marginal benefit of using debt to discipline managers. Finally, an increase in profitability reduces the likelihood of firm bankruptcy and the cost of financial distress originated by the use of debt. Thus, all these reasons lead the TOT to predict a positive relationship between profitability and debt.
According to the POT, the opposite relationship is expected: Firms passively accumulate retained earnings, becoming less levered when they are profitable. All things being equal, the more profitable the firms are, the more internal financing they will have, and therefore we should expect a negative relationship between leverage and profitability. This negative relationship is one of the most systematic findings in the empirical literature (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) .
Following Ozkan (2001) and Miguel and Pindado (2001) , we proxy profitability (PROFIT) as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets.
c) Growth opportunities
The TOT predicts that, controlling for the profitability of assets in place, firms with more investment opportunities have less leverage because: (1) Greater investment opportunities in the firm are associated with a lower free cash flow and less need for the disciplinary role of debt over manager behaviour (Jensen, 1986) ; (2) Firms with growth opportunities have more agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders because shareholders in these firms have stronger incentives to underinvest and greater possibilities of risk-shifting substitution (Myers, 1977) ; (3) Finally, as the value of growth opportunities is close to zero in the case of bankruptcy, the cost of financial distress associated with the use of debt will be higher in firms in which the investment opportunities represent a greater percentage of the current value of the firm (Myers, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991) . All these reasons lead the TOT to predict a negative relationship between investment opportunities and debt in the firm. These arguments are consistent with firms using equity to finance their growth (Jung et al., 1996) and with firms with less growth prospects using debt because of its disciplinary role (Jensen, 1986) .
In contrast, the POT predicts a positive marginal relation between leverage and growth opportunities because investment opportunities originate strong financing needs and, all things being equal, will lead to the issuing of more debt. Moreover, as information asymmetries with respect to investment opportunities are higher than with respect to assets in place, the POT predicts a higher preference for debt relative to equity in firms with greater growth opportunities. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) , growth opportunities (GROWTH) has been measured in this paper as the growth rate of total assets.
d) Intangibility of assets
According to the TOT, intangibility of assets has an impact on the borrowing decisions of a firm for at least two reasons: 1) intangible assets have a lower value than tangible assets in the case of bankruptcy and thus increase the cost of financial distress associated with the use of debt, and 2) the agency costs between stockholders and creditors are greater when the firm does not offer tangible assets as collateral because the probability of risk-shifting by shareholders is solely limited to the assets that are not offered as collateral. Consistent with these arguments, most of the previous evidence highlights a negative relation between intangible assets and the level of debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003) .
From the POT perspective, firms with more intangible assets are more subject to information asymmetries and will therefore issue debt rather than equity when they need external financing (Harris and Raviv, 1991) . For this reason, ceteris paribus profitability and investment opportunities, the POT predicts a positive relation between intangibility of assets and firm leverage.
We proxy the intangibility of assets (INTANG) as the ratio between intangible assets and total assets. This variable was used by Titman and Wessels (1988) as an indicator that is negatively related to the collateral value.
Given that our basic hypothesis forecasts a greater validity of the POT in smaller firms and that the POT and TOT differ in the predicted influence for profitability, growth opportunities, and asset intangibility on firm leverage, we may extend hypothesis H.1. as follows:
H.1.a. The greater predominance of the predictions of the POT in smaller firms leads to forecasting a greater negative influence of profitability and a greater positive influence of investment opportunities and of intangible assets on firm leverage in this type of firm.

Target firm leverage and adjustment costs
The existence of a target firm leverage that firms wish to maintain in each period is the other difference between the TOT and the POT. Under the TOT, there exists an optimum level of indebtedness resulting from compensating benefits with the costs of debt. As the determinants of the costs and benefits of debt, examined in the previous section, are relatively stable over time, the firm's optimum indebtedness will also be stable. However, the existence of adjustment costs impede a complete adjustment and hence the standard framework adopted for testing the TOT is a partial adjustment model in which the change in leverage partially absorbs the difference between target leverage and lagged leverage.
In contrast, under the POT there exists no target leverage that firms aim to maintain in each period, but rather the leverage varies from one period to another depending on the profitability and investment opportunities in the firm. Thus, higher earnings, ceteris paribus investment opportunities, increase the possibilities of retaining benefits and result in less leverage. Higher investment opportunities, ceteris paribus earnings, result in higher leverage.
The different predictions of the TOT and the POT concerning the existence of a target leverage mean that our main hypothesis (H.1) may be extended in the following way: 
Econometric specification and database
Methodology
The empirical model proposed in this paper accounts for the potentially dynamic nature of a firm's capital structure. The model tests whether there is a leverage target and if so, what the adjustment speed is with which a firm moves toward its target 2 . Changes in the debt ratio (D it -D it-1 ) partially absorb the difference between target leverage (D it *) and lagged leverage (D it-1 ).
where the transaction costs that impede a complete adjustment to the target leverage are measured by the coefficient , which varies between 0 and 1 and is inversely related to adjustment costs.
As the target debt is unobservable, we model it as a linear function of the determining factors of capital structure reviewed in the previous section.
where D* it is the target leverage of firm i in year t and its explanatory variables are the non-debt tax shields (NDTS), profitability (PROF), growth opportunities (GROWTH) and the intangibility of the firm's assets (INTANG).
Incorporating Eq. (2) into Eq. (1) and considering that estimations were carried out with panel data, we get:  is the firm effect, which is assumed constant for firm i over t; and it  is the error term.
In the estimations, we apply the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1991) . This methodology is specifically designed to address three econometric issues: (1) the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects;
(2) the autoregressive process in the data regarding the behaviour of leverage ratio; and (3) the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. To address this issue, we consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) . The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. This test confirms the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term in our models. The second test examines the hypothesis of lack of second-order serial correlation in the first difference residuals (m 2 ). In our models, this hypothesis of second-order serial correlation is always rejected. Although there is first-order serial correlation (m 1 ) in the differentiated residuals, it is due to the first difference of models.
Database
The partial adjustment model of firm leverage described in Equation [3 is estimated in a sample of Spanish firms over the period 1995-2003. 3 The financial data are obtained from SABI, which is a database that contains financial information on public limited companies. We exclude: (1) financial firms because their financing decision follows other determinants; (2) firms with less than 10 employees (these are considered as micro-enterprises according to European Union criteria); and (3) firms for which data required in our analyses were unavailable. Finally, the number of firms included in the sample is 3,439 and the sample consists of 16,284 firm-year observations.
As a measure of firm leverage, we use the ratio between the book value of debt (both long term and short term) and the book value of total assets. This measure provides a good indication of financial leverage, since total liabilities also includes items like accounts payable, which may be used for transactions purposes rather than for financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and has been used, among others, by Flannery and Rangan (2006) .
We split the sample into small, medium and large enterprises applying the criteria of firm size defined by the European Union in the Commission Recommendation of 3 rd April 1996
(96/280/EC).
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In Table 1 we can observe that for the total sample the mean leverage ratio is 29.54 percent with an average profitability of 10.82 percent and a mean growth rate of total assets of 10.97 percent.
However, these values vary according to firm size. Large firms show a higher leverage ratio, profitability and growth rate of assets than small firms. The differences in these variables among small, medium and large firms are likewise significant when using a t-test such as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of the partial adjustment model [3] for the whole sample of firms. Column
Results
(1) contains the estimates of the basic model without controlling for size, while columns (2), (3) and (4) Moreover, as intangible assets originate greater information asymmetries than tangible assets, the preference for debt relative to equity would increase with the percentage of intangible assets in the firm under the POT.
These results in Spanish firms constitute greater support for the POT than is generally found in prior studies for other countries. Although studies in other countries coincide in reporting a negative relation between profitability and debt, they differ in their findings in that the intangibility of assets and growth opportunities are usually negatively associated with firm leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Gaud et al. 2005) . The greater support obtained for the POT compared to other studies is consistent with the inclusion in the present study of small firms, if the POT has more validity in this type of firm.
Firm size, measured by LN(TA) and LN(EMP), has the traditional positive impact on leverage that has been documented in many empirical studies for other countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Gaud et al., 2005;  López-Iturriaga and Rodríguez-Sanz, 2008).
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)
The estimation of the model [3 depending on firm size is reported in Table 4 . The first three columns in Table 4 show the results obtained separately for small, medium and large firms. In accordance with the results reported above, the coefficient associated with the variable DEBT t-1 is positive and statistically significant and takes similar values regardless of firm size. The variable NDTS has negative and statically significant coefficients in the case of small and medium firms.
These negative coefficients are consistent with the TOT and suggest that smaller-sized firms are the ones that use debt for tax reasons. The remaining variables, PROFIT, GROWTH and INTANG, present coefficients consistent with the POT, especially for small firms. The variable PROFIT presents negative coefficients in line with the fact that firms with higher profitability use less debt due to the greater possibility of using retained earnings. The positive coefficients of GROWTH for small firms is consistent with the fact that greater growth opportunities, ceteris paribus profitability, increases the needs for debt. The positive coefficient of INTANG supports the prediction of the POT that firms with more intangible assets are subject to higher information asymmetries and that they will issue debt rather than equity if the retained earnings are not enough. The greater positive influence of intangible assets and growth opportunities and the greater negative influence of profitability on the debt ratio in the case of small firms, compared to medium and large firms, would be consistent with the predominance of the predictions of the POT in small firms.
We define a dummy variable, SMALL, that takes a value of 1 for small firms and 0 otherwise, which interacts with the remaining explanatory variables and it allows to analyze whether there are statistically significant differences across size groups. In this specification, the coefficients of the interaction terms indicate the differences in the respective explanatory variable in small firms with respect to the remaining firms. On the other hand, the coefficients of the explanatory variables now
show the influence that they have on firm leverage for those firms that are not small in size. Thus, in column (4) we compare small firms versus medium and large firms and in column (5) we exclude medium firms to capture the differences between small and large firms.
The results of columns (4) and (5) do not indicate differences in the adjustment speed to the target leverage between small and large firms, as the coefficients of DEBT t-1 *SMALL are not statistically significant. However, the coefficients of NDTS*SMALL are negative and statistically significant, revealing that the tax benefit of debt is more important in small than in large firms in determing the leverage ratio. 
Conclusions
This paper analyzes whether the validity of the TOT and the POT to explain firm capital structure varies with firm size. Results are partially consistent with both explanations in Spanish firms.
Consistent with the TOT, firms have a target leverage which they adjust to in each period, using more debt as the tax advantages of debt grow. Consistent with the POT, firm leverage is positively related to investment opportunities and the percentage of intangible assets, and negatively related to profitability.
Furthermore, our results indicate that the predominance of the TOT and the POT varies across firm size. The positive relationship of firm leverage with investment opportunities and intangible assets and the negative relation with firm profitability are stronger in small firms than in medium and large firms. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that higher information asymmetries in small firms originate greater validity of the pecking order theory in this type of firm. Despite the greater validity of the pecking order predictions in small firms, there are no differences in the adjustment speed to the target leverage across firms with a different size.
Our results highlight the convenience of controlling for firm size when testing the validity of explanatory theories of firm capital structure and have important policy implications. The paper suggests the relevance of bank development to facilitate the access of small firms to external financing. A greater development of the banking system that increases screening and monitoring of debtors by banks will be specially useful to reduce the greater information asymetries of small firms. As a consequence, a challenge for policy makers would be to provide a regulation and institutions that favors a greater development of the banking system, the higher the presence of small firms. Moreover, a regulation that facilitates close lending relationships between banks and firms will also be more beneficial to reduce the funding cost in economies with a greater presence of small firms. 
